The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the restructuring of Copyright Law and Author's Rights: Creators - Exploiters - Non-commercial Users - Intermediaries by Kreutzer, Till et al.
www.ssoar.info
The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the
restructuring of Copyright Law and Author's
Rights: Creators - Exploiters - Non-commercial
Users - Intermediaries
Kreutzer, Till; Christiansen, Per; Gehlen, Dirk von; Hofmann, Jeanette;
Klimpel, Paul; Köklü, Kaya; Otto, Philipp; Schindler, Mathias; Wattig,
Leander; Renner, Tim
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kreutzer, T., Christiansen, P., Gehlen, D. v., Hofmann, J., Klimpel, P., Köklü, K., ... Renner, T. (2016). The Berlin
Gedankenexperiment on the restructuring of Copyright Law and Author's Rights: Creators - Exploiters - Non-
commercial Users - Intermediaries. JIPITEC - Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic
Commerce Law, 7(2), 76-87. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-44355
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Basic Digital Peer Publishing-Lizenz
zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen
finden Sie hier:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a Basic Digital Peer
Publishing Licence. For more Information see:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Kreutzer, Till et al.
Article  —  Published Version
The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the restructuring of Copyright
Law and Author’s Rights – Creators – Exploiters – Non-commercial
Users – Intermediaries
JIPITEC - Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic
Commerce Law
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Kreutzer, Till et al. (2016) : The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the
restructuring of Copyright Law and Author’s Rights – Creators – Exploiters – Non-commercial
Users – Intermediaries, JIPITEC - Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and
Electronic Commerce Law, ISSN 2190-3387, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Recht und Informatik e.
V., Karlsruhe, Vol. 7, Iss. 2, pp. 76-87,
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-29-44355
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175660
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
 http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/dppl/DPPL_v2_en_06-2004.html
www.econstor.eu
2016
Till Kreutzer et al
76 2
The Berlin Gedankenexperiment 
on the restructuring of Copyright 
Law and Author’s Rights
– Creators – Exploiters – Non-commercial Users – Intermediaries –
by Till Kreutzer et al.
© 2016 Till Kreutzer et al.
Everybody may disseminate this article by electronic means and make it available for download under the terms and 
conditions of the Digital Peer Publishing Licence (DPPL). A copy of the license text may be obtained at http://nbn-resolving.
de/urn:nbn:de:0009-dppl-v3-en8.
Recommended citation:  Till Kreutzer et al., The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the restructuring of Copyright Law and 
Author’s Rights, 7 (2016) JIPITEC 76, para 1.
Project Lead: 
Till Kreutzer, PhD, iRights.Lab, iRights.Law, iRights.info 
Expert Panel:
Per Christiansen, PhD, Professor at FOM – Hochschule für Ökonomie und Management 
Dirk v. Gehlen, Director “Social Media/Innovation” at Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Jeanette Hofmann, PhD, Science Centre Berlin, Alexander v. Humboldt Institute for Internet & Society
Paul Klimpel, PhD, iRights.Law
Kaya Köklü, PhD, Max-Planck-Institute for Innovation and Competition 
Philipp Otto, iRights.Lab, iRights.info
Mathias Schindler, Assistant to Julia Reda, MEP, formerly Wikimedia Deutschland e.V.
Leander Wattig, Blogger, Independent Consultant for Publishers, Lecturer at UdK Berlin 
Project Advisor:
Tim Renner, Secretary of State for Culture, Berlin, formerly Motor Music
The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the restructuring of Copyright Law and Author’s Rights
201677 2
Preface:1
1 The concept for a regulatory system concerning 
creative goods, as elaborated within the Berlin 
Gedankenexperiment, dates back to the third initiative 
of the “Internet & Gesellschaft Collaboratory” 
(2010-2011).
2 Back then, a panel of experts took the initiative 
and developed a set of Guidelines for a copyright 
law in the digital world, which took the form of a 
regulatory system for creative informational goods2 
(see final report of the 3rd. Initiative, p. 99 et. seq)3. 
The idea was to develop a new form of regulation 
that would withstand the challenges of the year 2035 
(that means a time perspective of about 25 years).
3 From the outset the Guidelines were considered a 
working hypothesis, which should be discussed, 
reconsidered and redefined. This task was taken up 
by a newly composed working group that concluded 
its work in 2015. With the Berlin Gedankenexperiment 
this group submits a thoroughly reviewed version 
of the Guidelines of 2011.4 The Gedankenexperiment at 
hand is thus a further stage of development of the 
first version of the Guidelines.5
4 The project´s work was based on a “blank page 
approach”. The project team was asked to imagine 
that copyright law had never existed and that we 
could, in fact, create a new legal concept, fit for the 
digital world. We tried to prevent that the conceptual 
work would be influenced by the current legal 
situation, e.g. by the status quo and the boundaries 
arising from international treaties and other 
frameworks. Nevertheless, the considerate reader 
will notice that there are a number of references 
to present deficits and comparisons to the current 
copyright regime. In some cases these references 
might apply more to authors´ rights regimes than to 
1 This paper was initially written in German. Translation into 
English by Sylvia Jakob and Till Kreutzer.
2 Original: „Leitlinien für ein Urheberrecht für die digitale 
Welt in Form eines Regelungssystems für kreative 
informationelle Güter“.
3 <http://dl.collaboratory.de/reports/Ini3_Urheberrecht.
pdf>. An English translation of the guidelines (not the whole 
report) can be found at: <http://www.collaboratory.de/w/
Datei:Ini3_Copyright_Excerpt.pdf>.
4 The present project was sponsored by the Internet & Society 
Collaboratory e.V. (Co:Lab) with 10.000 Euros. The amount 
was spent on workshops, travel expenses and organization. 
No expert was paid a fee. We thank the steering committee 
of Co:Lab for its support. Co:Lab was not involved in the 
production of the contents and did not influence their 
development. The present publication reflects the personal 
opinion of the experts involved and is not necessarily 
consistent with the position of Co:Lab or of any of the 
respective institutions for which the experts work.
5 For a better understanding of the Gedankenexperiment it is 
recommended to read the original guidelines.
copyright regimes, in others the opposite might be 
true. It should be noted, however, that the criticism 
of the present situation is not the focus of this paper. 
It is rather a means to illustrate and underpin the 
arguments for the newly suggested approach.
5 Akin to the Guidelines, the Gedankenexperiment 
constitutes a contribution to the discussion on the 
restructuring of copyright law in the digital age. 
However, the Gedankenexperiment does not come 
up with concrete legislative proposals; instead it 
outlines a regulatory concept. In particular, it is 
meant to determine actors and their particular 
interests and assign them roles and abstract rights 
and duties.
6 Within this framework, suggestions for essential, 
regulatory aspects of copyright law are made, for 
example regarding exclusive rights of creators and 
exploiters6. However, no specific evaluative decisions 
regarding points of detail are made. To answer these 
is not the aim of the Gedankenexperiment – but can 
and should be the task of follow-up projects.
A. Preamble
I. Regulatory Purpose
7 The Gedankenexperiment serves to conceptualize 
a framework of an institutionalized balance of 
interests in the form of a regulatory system that 
governs the creation, commercialization, use and 
mediation of creative goods. This regulatory system 
will foster creativity, art, culture and entertainment 
and thereby serve the public as a whole. To achieve 
this aim, individual interests will be guarded by 
protective, partly exclusive, rights. Guaranteeing 
such rights is meant to secure income opportunities 
for creative professionals and provide incentives to 
invest in creative, immaterial goods.
8 These protective rights, however, have to be 
implemented in a way that pays due regard to the 
public interest and to other conflicting interests. In 
other words, a balance needs to be struck, in which 
the respective interests receive the greatest possible 
consideration.
9 The regulatory system is thus more than a means 
to protect individual rights. It is an instrument that 
will allow the balancing of diverging interests, which 
may from time to time collide with one another. Akin 
6 In this context the term „exploiter“ is used for commercial 
users of protected creative goods. These are especially 
traditional producers such as publishers, labels or 
distributors and on top of that anybody who needs a license 
to use a protected work.
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to the principle of balancing fundamental rights 
the Gedankenexperiment assumes that none of the 
involved interests enjoys a structural superiority. 
Whether one interest should be given priority 
over another needs to be determined in concrete 
evaluative decisions. In this context we assume 
that every legal position assigned by the regulatory 
system will have to be justified per se. This applies 
as much to the legal positions of non-commercial 
users, as to those of creators, exploiters and 
intermediaries7. A right will thus only be granted to 
the extent that it is justified in relation to the public 
interest and conflicting individual interests of the 
other parties involved.
II. Regulatory concept 
10 The regulatory system for creative goods 
distinguishes four relevant groups of actors: 
creators, exploiters, non-commercial users and 
intermediaries. Their corresponding rights and 
duties are separate and separable, thus creating 
isolated spheres, within which the interests of the 
differing groups will be assessed. Thereby, distinct 
rights of creators, exploiters and non-commercial 
users accrue.
11 Due to the systematic separation, all actors will obtain 
distinct legal positions, which do not overlap and 
may not be re-assigned or licensed. The framing of 
each legal position is based on a thorough assessment 
of the individual situation of the respective actor. 
Thereby, one major flaw of current copyright 
regimes, as identified by the expert group, shall be 
prevented: If an actor assigns her legal position to 
another actor, the purpose of the protective right 
is undermined, as these rights were tailored to the 
needs of the first actor. This happens often in the 
relation between authors and exploiters who often 
have and pursue different interests. The balance of 
interests is thus jeopardized. A protective system 
based on these premises cannot establish a true 
balance of interests, as it is impossible to predict who 
ultimately owns the rights and who may exercise 
them.
12 The current copyright law systems, notably the 
European authors´ rights regime, suffer considerably 
from this flaw. Officially they are guided by the 
interests of the author. Political decisions are 
generally justified in the author’s name. Practically, 
however, most legal positions accruing from the 
right of the author lie in the hands of exploiters. 
These legal positions, and in particular copyrights 
7 “Intermediaries“ stands for actors who are not using 
protected material in terms of the law. They do not copy 
or distribute protected goods but provide the technical 
infrastructure that enables others (their users) to do so.
and exploitation rights, are in many cases to a 
greater or lesser extent contractually assigned or 
exclusively licensed. Exploiters, however, have 
other interests as to the exploitation of the work, 
i.e. in many cases they exercise the rights differently 
than the author herself might have exercised them. 
In addition, exploiters have their own legitimate 
interests for protection, which differ from those 
of the author and vice versa. Confusing and mixing 
authors’ and exploiters’ interests opens space 
for manipulative arguments, which may foster 
undesirable developments. These lead to a conflict 
of values, which may ultimately undermine the 
copyright law system as a whole.
13 To prevent such inconsistencies the 
Gedankenexperiment abandons the concept of 
derived rights and assignments. It proposes a strict 
distinction between authors´ and exploiters’ rights. 
The authors´ rights will focus on the creator and will 
not be able to be licensed or assigned to exploiters. 
The latter, in turn, have rights of their own rights, 
which are tailored to their specific economic needs 
and which – opposed to authors´ rights – may be 
traded on the market.
14 The concept resembles the system of copy- and 
neighboring rights in the current authors´ rights 
systems. However, there is a fundamental difference 
due to the inability to re-assign or license legal 
positions of the author.
15 According to current law it is not only possible, but 
also necessary for a exploiter to obtain the rights to 
exploit a creative work from the author. In addition, 
exploiters have their own neighboring rights e.g. in a 
film production. Thereby different protective rights 
accumulate in the position of the exploiter.
16 An example: A composer licenses the copyrights in 
her work exclusively and for the whole duration of 
the copyright to a music label. The label thereby 
obtains the exclusive right to exploit the work, 
potentially for the coming 100 years or more, 
depending on how long the author lives. The work, 
however, is blocked for the exploitation by third 
parties, unless the copyrights owner (here the label) 
decides to allow it. In addition, the label has exclusive 
rights in the recordings that were produced from the 
composition.
17 Under the Gedankenexperiment such rights 
accumulation is neither possible, nor necessary.8 
Instead, its regulatory system suggests a different 
approach:
8 An exception applies only to those cases in which the 
creator is simultaneously the exploiter (e.g. in the case of 
self-publishers).
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18 The creator can only grant the label a permission to 
exploit the work9 for a limited period of time (e.g. 
five years10). This permission might also be exclusive. 
During this time the exploiter’s initial investment 
is protected by two legal positions: (1) The contract 
with the author that prevents her from giving further 
permissions to publish her work to other exploiters. 
(2) The exploiter’s own right in the published work, 
which enables them to take legal action against free 
riders. After the creators’ permission has expired, 
she can allow another producer to use the work 
or exploit it herself. The exploiter, in turn, can 
continue marketing their own edition/production 
of the work, although they might have to cope with 
competition by other productions. The creator will 
not only benefit from the first, but also from any 
following publication by means of contractually 
agreed remunerations and statutory claims for 
monetary compensation. Society as a whole, in turn, 
profits from the resulting free competition.
B. Rights and duties of the creator
19 One of the main principles of the regulatory system 
is that the creator of a work should own the right in 
her creation (author’s right)11. The right is bound to 
the individual and cannot be assigned nor licensed 
to third parties, neither exclusively nor non-
exclusively, neither entirely, nor in parts. It can only 
be owned by a natural person.
I. Objective and scope of protection 
of the author’s right
20 The work will be protected as an intangible 
commodity (as under current copyright law). The 
exclusive ownership of the work that follows from 
the author´s right includes both economical and 
moral rights. The author can therefore decide, if 
and who may use/exploit her work and under which 
conditions. The scope of protection ends where 
interests of third parties – in particular those of the 
general public – prevail.
9 See the details of this concept below, sec. II.2.
10 As far as terms of protection or other terms are named 
in the Gedankenexperiment they need to be understood as 
variable. How long individual protective positions shall be 
granted or promises of exclusivity be valid, would have to 
be determined considering various factors, e.g. economic 
and demographic ones, etc. Such valuation is not part of the 
Gedankenexperiment.
11 Note the difference: “copyright” versus “author’s right”.
II. Relationship between the author’s 
rights and the exploiter’s rights
21 In principle, both exploiters and creators have their 
own rights, which they can exercise independently. 
The creator cannot assign or license any usage/
exploitation rights to the exploiter. Nonetheless, 
she may grant the exploiter an all-encompassing 
or limited permission to use/exploit the work for a 
limited period of time.
22 This is a contractually declared permission to first 
publish the work or use/exploit the work exclusively 
and/or non-exclusively for a limited period of 
time. Legally, the permission does not constitute 
a license/transfer of individual author’s rights in 
rem but a consent under the law of obligations, i.e. 
under contract law. It can, if the creator agrees, be 
transferred to third parties. Should a creator grant 
a exploiter an exclusive permission to use or exploit 
the work (exclusivity agreement), she can only do 
so for a limited amount of time. The exclusivity 
agreement expires, depending on which point in 
time comes first, either after its maximum term of 
duration (e.g. 5 years) or with the expiration of the 
exploiter’s right in her own edition/production. 
Should the exploiter’s exploitation right be 
extended by means of registration (see below IV.4), 
the exclusivity agreement can also be extended. 
However, in order to prevent the creator from 
entering into promises of exclusivity without being 
able to predict their overall effect on her interests at 
a later stage, any extension should be accompanied 
by an additional agreement. For works made-for-
hire or those which are part of more complex works 
such as films exceptions could be made from the 
aforementioned restrictions on the transferability 
of author´s rights.
23 If the exclusive permission to use/exploit is not 
extended, it may continue on a non-exclusive basis 
(depending on the agreement with the author). 
This would ensure that the exploiter can continue 
marketing the product, although without being the 
exclusive exploiter of the work.
24 Promises of exclusivity should be registered in a 
public registry in order to provide legal certainty. 
Promises of exclusivity not registered by the 
exploiter cannot be enforced against third parties.12
25 If the exclusivity agreement is registered, one can 
assume that it is publicly known and effective 
against any third party independent of their actual 
knowledge of the exclusivity agreement. The effect of 
12 This means the exploiter may use or exploit the work. 
Without registration, however, she cannot prevent a third 
party from using or exploiting the work even though the 
creator promised her exclusivity.
2016
Till Kreutzer et al
80 2
a registered exclusivity agreement is thus similar to 
exclusive licenses under current copyright law but 
the negative ramifications of extensive licensing for 
the author are prevented.13
26 Should a competitor violate a registered exclusivity 
agreement, the exploiter can pursue them on the 
basis of either unfair competition law or the right 
accruing from their own production. In turn the 
creator who violates the exclusivity agreement by 
allowing a third party to use or exploit the work can 
be pursued under contract law.
27 Examples of the effects of the permission to use 
or exploit a particular work:
•	 Example 1: An author writes a novel. She grants 
a publisher the permission to first publish the 
work and promises him exclusivity for the 
maximum duration possible (e.g. 5 years). The 
publisher’s exclusive right in his own edition 
(i.e. the proofread version of the book) might 
also last for five years since the date of first 
publication.14 The exclusivity agreement thus 
expires simultaneously with the publisher’s 
own right. After its termination the exclusivity 
agreement automatically transforms into a non-
exclusive permission to use or exploit the work. 
From the date of termination, the author can 
allow a different publisher to re-publish her 
novel.
•	 Example 2: (variation): The author promises 
exclusivity but only for a period of three years 
after the first publication. Subsequently the 
creator can allow a different publisher to re-
publish her work. This re-publication does not 
interfere with the first publisher’s own exclusive 
right since it does not have the exclusive right 
to market the work (i.e. a novel), but only an 
exclusive right to its own edition of the novel 
(i.e. the version proofread and arranged by the 
first publisher).
•	 Example 3: A singer-songwriter allows a record 
label to produce, publish and market her song 
for a period of three years exclusively. The 
label’s own exclusive right in the production 
has a duration of (assumingly) ten years. After 
the exclusivity agreement expires, the label’s 
13 For example the negative consequences of rights diffusion 
are avoided, inter alia because the exclusivity agreement 
only applies as long as the exploiter’s own rights exist and 
because it can only be exercised vis á vis third parties if it 
has been registered. This approach prevents the erosion 
of values underlying the exclusivity right in copyright by 
avoiding unimpeded, unlimited transfer of rights or licenses 
to the exploiter.
14 See in relation to the proposition of time frames in this 
Gedankenexperiment the annotation in fn 10.
own right continues to exist for another seven 
years. During these seven years the label can 
exploit its production on the basis of its own 
exclusive right. After three years however the 
composer can allow a different label to create 
a new production, which will again acquire 
rights of its own. In the years after the expiry 
of the exclusivity agreement, both productions 
compete on the market.
•	 Example 4: A film director allows a film 
producer to exploit her work for a period of 
three years exclusively. The producer’s own 
right in the production amounts to (assumingly) 
10 years. Since the creative achievement of the 
film director will be inextricably interwoven 
with the contributions of the other participants 
in the production (e.g. cameramen) as well as 
being an inextricable part of the film production 
as a complex work, the terms of the exclusivity 
agreement and the producer’s own rights should 
be synchronized. The director will in any case 
not be able to permit other producers to use her 
particular creative achievement. For cases like 
these special rules are needed.
III. Additional protection through 
copyright contract law
28 Although the power imbalance between creators and 
exploiters can be mitigated to a considerable degree 
by restricting extensive exclusive agreements, 
the need to protect creators against contractual 
overreaching still subsists.
29 There is, for instance, still a need to guarantee 
the author an appropriate remuneration and to 
protect her from entering into excessive promises 
of exclusivity. Hence there is a need for a strong, 
albeit balanced, copyright contract law.
30 Furthermore should creators be given the 
unlimited possibility to grant the general public 
far reaching, non-exclusive, indefinite and royalty-
free permissions to use the work in order to ensure 
the functioning of open source and open content 
licenses.
IV. Protection of the alimentation 
interests through rights to a fair 
share and adequate compensation
31 In order to safeguard the interests of the general 
public, the term of protection for exclusive author´s 
rights should be restricted adequately. Excessively 
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long exclusive rights obstruct the use of intellectual 
creations and generate legal uncertainty for re-
publications or may even render them impossible 
since it is increasingly difficult to ascertain who 
owns the copyright.
32 This leads to the phenomenon of orphan works, 
excessive pricing and under- or non-usage, caused by 
the exclusive right´s artificially elevated transaction 
costs (licensing efforts and royalties). This applies 
first and foremost to digital exploitation, for which 
the marginal costs are so low that the likelihood 
of a re-use by third parties after the expiry of the 
protection period would normally be very high. 
However, if exclusive rights are granted excessively 
and their term of protection is determined too long, 
the likeliness of re-publication and further use will 
decrease significantly since there is no economic 
incentive to re-publish the work.
33 If the transaction costs to identify the rights owner 
or concluding individual license deals are too high 
for commercial disseminators or public institutions, 
many cultural works will disappear sooner or later 
although there might be a strong cultural interest in 
their availability and preservation. The protection 
of the public interest as the main goal of the legal 
system outlined in the Gedankenexperiment requires 
adequate restrictions of the exclusive rights.
34 As such a more reasonable duration for exclusive 
author´s rights than it is provided in current 
copyright systems is proposed. Instead of excessive 
exclusivity the Gedankenexperiment proposes a less 
invasive instrument of protection for authors. After 
the expiry of exclusive rights the creators should 
be legally entitled to profit sharing. Such claims 
particularly aim to protect the economical interests 
of the creators.
35 Any author should have a claim to a fair share of the 
commercial revenues derived from the exploitation 
of her work. Such a share would allow the creator 
to participate economically in her work’s success, 
but prevents inflated licensing transaction costs. 
The difference to exclusive rights is obvious: 
whoever wants to use or exploit the work can do so 
without seeking prior permission and may not be 
prevented from doing so but has to pay the creator 
a monetary compensation. Hence the monetary 
compensation has only a narrow limiting effect 
on the use. Functioning structures to collect and 
distribute such remunerations provided, the burden 
for using the material would be manageable. A well-
balanced system of exclusive rights and rights to 
monetary compensation enables an adequately 
refined protection of the creator and at the same 
time serves all other parties involved.
V. Protection of idealistic interests 
– the author’s moral rights
36 The creator has moral rights, which protect in 
particular her interest in being recognized as the 
author, but also protect the work against distortions 
and non-authorized primary publications. These 
moral rights are based on other requirements than 
the economic exclusivity rights. Therefore they 
have an independent term of protection and may 
– similarly to claims for monetary compensation – 
under certain circumstances be bequeathed.
VI. Duration of the author’s rights
37 When assessing the duration of author´s rights, 
it is important to consider their independent 
components. First and foremost a distinction should 
be made between economic protection rights and 
the author’s moral rights.
38 The author’s moral rights are inheritable; their 
duration can be determined (as under current 
copyright law) by the creator´s lifetime. Moral 
rights should have a uniform term that should be 
determined balancing the different interests.
39 For economic exclusive rights and claims for 
monetary compensation, different terms of 
protection are proposed. Above all, the exclusive 
rights allow the creator to control the first 
publication of her work and the negotiation of the 
best possible conditions. Their duration should not 
depend on the category of the work and be assessed 
according to the principle “as long as necessary, as 
short as possible”. Since the purpose of the exclusive 
rights is first and foremost directed at the primary 
publication, their term of protection should be 
calculated from the moment of first publication.15
40 After a certain period of time exclusive rights 
are transformed into a claim for monetary 
compensation. This approach allows the creator to 
continue participating in the economic exploitation 
of her work. For employed creators exceptions can 
be made. The claims for monetary compensation 
should be calculated autonomously and objectively 
and be equal for all types of creators and works.
41 Since the author’s exclusive exploitation rights (and 
in particular the claims for monetary compensation) 
15 That does not mean that the rights only accrue with the 
first publication, but that the duration of the exclusive 
rights will only be counted from that point in time. That 
way it cannot occur that the exclusive rights have already 
expired, when a creator decides to publish her work long 
after its creation.
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will also serve alimentation interests, they should 
be inheritable.16 In order to prevent increasing legal 
insecurity their duration should not extend beyond 
a reasonable period. They could, for instance, be 
limited to 20 years after the creator´s death.
C. Rights and duties of exploiters
42 In the digital world the exploiter still assumes 
a leading role. He invests in the production and 
distribution of creative goods and services and is, 
in many cases, the first to make them available (e.g. 
film productions). Based on the underlying idea of 
investment protection for distinct achievements, he 
ought to obtain an exclusive right on his specific 
design, edition or production (i.e. his “edition of 
the respective work”). Being an exclusive right, 
the exploiter’s right is meant to safeguard the 
amortization of investments and provide financial 
incentives to make them. The exploiter´s right 
accrues for the exploiter and is not a right derived 
from the creator. It can be assigned to third parties – 
as a whole or in parts. Exploiters obtain the necessary 
permission to use the work from the creator via 
promises of exclusivity or non-exclusive permissions 
(for details see above B.II).
I. Subject matter of the 
exploiter’s right
43 It is the individual achievement of the exploiter 
which is being protected, i.e. the particular 
production, edition or issue of the respective work. 
The subject matter of the exploiter’s right is thus the 
specific implementation of a creative product (e.g. a 
music recording or a movie).
II. Accrual of the exploiter’s right
44 In order to prevent unjustifiable disadvantages for 
small exploiters, the exploiter’s right should accrue 
automatically and without registration when their 
edition of the work has been produced. The right 
accrues, similar to today’s neighboring rights, for 
the one who has made the essential investments 
and carries the financial risk. The publication of the 
product is, however, only allowed if the creator had 
previously granted the necessary permission to use 
and exploit his work.
16 Even though the duration of the exclusive rights is measured 
relatively shortly, they should be heritable. In any case it is 
possible that the creator dies shortly after the creation of 
the work.
III. Subject matter and scope 
of the exploiter’s right
45 Exploiters have an exclusive right to their product, 
i.e. in their own specific implementation, edition, 
assembly, production. They can transfer that right 
and assign it fully or in parts to third parties or grant 
exclusive or non-exclusive licenses (as long as the 
creator agreed to grant a transferrable permission 
to use her work). Following therefrom, the concept 
of the exploiter’s right corresponds to the concept 
of neighboring rights. Exploiters can enforce their 
right against piracy and other non-authorized uses 
of their goods and services based on their own right. 
Being a right owner they can claim injunctive relief, 
removal and damages. Should a competitor violate a 
registered exclusivity agreement, the exploiter can 
resort to competition law.
IV. Terms of protection of 
the exploiter’s right
46 The exploiter´s right constitutes first and foremost 
a protection of investment. Its term should 
therefore be calculated based on economic facts and 
assessments. Given that the product of the exploiter 
enjoys a quasi monopoly that interferes extensively 
with free competition, the principle of “as long as 
necessary, as short as possible” should be applied 
in this context.
47 As to the specification of the term of protection two 
models can be considered, both of which come with 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it 
might be possible to define product specific terms 
of protection, in order to account for the different 
diffusion curves on the markets.17 The advantages of 
market-oriented differentiation are, however, offset 
by serious disadvantages as to legal security. The 
convergence of traditional and new types of works 
based on multi-media, such as computer games, 
would raise considerable problems in this model. 
In addition, in a model based on market-oriented 
differentiation the terms of protection would have 
to be continuously changed in order to be able to 
account for the changing market conditions.
48 In light of these disadvantages it seems that an 
approach applying uniform terms of protection – 
i.e. terms of protection which are independent of 
product and market – should be preferred. In order 
to calculate an ideal uniform term of protection, one 
should – just as in patent law – consider the average 
17 This approach was preferred in the original guidelines, see 
final report, p. 117 (<http://dl.collaboratory.de/reports/
Ini3_Urheberrecht.pdf>).
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amortization period as a guideline. In other words, 
the term would have to be determined in line with 
the period of time in which investments into creative 
products usually pay off.
49 In order to prevent (in individual cases) inadequately 
short terms of protection, they should be able to be 
extended by registration. The registration should 
be subject to considerable yearly fees that should 
progress in amount the longer the protection lasts. 
The opportunity to extend the term of protection 
should be limited in time (e.g. 20 years after 
publication) in order to avoid the negative effects 
of excessively long exclusive rights and to reconcile 
the interests of the general public with the interests 
of investment protection on the side the exploiters. 
The registration fees can be spent on cultural 
purposes or similar.
D. Rights and duties of non-
commercial users
50 The duties of non-commercial users18 ensue from the 
protection rights of creators and exploiters. Within 
the scope of the exclusive rights of creators and/
or exploiters, the work may not be used without 
permission. Should legislation guarantee the non-
commercial user a right to use the work or the 
respective production, these rights prevail over the 
exclusive rights. In other words the exclusive rights 
are limited in scope.
I. Non-commercial users rights 
as enforceable personal rights 
51 Different from the current system of exceptions and 
limitations especially in author’s rights systems, 
the Gedankenexperiment protects the interests of 
non-commercial users by own rights. These user’s 
rights are not derived from statutory limitations of 
the author’s or exploiter’s rights. They rather are 
separate and individual legal positions that belong 
to the non-commercial users.
52 The balance of interests between creators, exploiters 
and non-commercial users is realized by defining the 
scope of the exclusive rights on the one hand and 
the user´s rights on the other. The non-commercial 
user’s interests are thus not subject to limitations 
of unlimited exclusivity rights, but constitute own 
subjective rights. They are outside the scope of 
18 Non-commercial users are referred to as users who use 
protected creative goods for their private or the public 
interest. Non-commercial users are individual members 
of the public and public institutions like museums, 
universities, archives and the like.
protection.
53 All rights – i.e. those of the non-commercial users, 
the creators and the rights owners – are generally 
considered equal. Hence, the freedom to use is 
no exception to a general overall exclusivity. 
Consequently, the non-commercial users´ rights do 
not form part of the protective exclusivity rights. 
As such, they cannot be contractually excluded.19 
Being individual rights they can even be enforced, 
e.g. when citations of films are impossible, because 
the exploiter sells his copies with technical 
copy protection measures. Such a system would 
acknowledge the public interest in legally protected 
freedoms to use and affirm them with strong legal 
positions.
II. Relationship between non-
commercial users’, authors’ 
and exploiters’ rights
54 The creation of an independent statutory sphere 
for non-commercial users´ rights establishes a 
consistent systematic approach towards balancing 
of the opposing interests. In addition, this approach 
prevents inconsistencies by guaranteeing that non-
commercial users´ rights are considered equal to 
the creator’s and the exploiter’s rights. Should a 
non-commercial user have a right of citation, she 
can enforce that right against both creators and 
exploiters.
III. The implementation of non-
commercial user rights 
55 As described in the original Guidelines20 non-
commercial users´ rights should be implemented 
by means of a regulatory system, which combines 
elements of both the continental European author´s 
right and US copyright law.
56 In practice, this means the establishment of a rule 
catalogue of typified usage rights (such as the 
limitation provisions under the present author’s 
right system) in which permitted acts are specifically 
described, such as the quotation right or private 
copying. This catalogue however is – other than 
19 In this model an exclusion of usage rights would lead to the 
contractual creation of protective rights and the extension 
of existing protective rights that are not envisaged by the 
law. Such a “law-perverting” drafting of contracts should 
(under certain circumstances) be expressly prohibited by 
law.
20 See p. 112 et seq. of the final report (< http://dl.collaboratory.
de/reports/Ini3_Urheberrecht.pdf>).
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under the current European copyright law – not 
exhaustive. It will be complemented with an open 
norm, i.e. a general clause for constellations, which 
do not fall under the rule catalogue.
57 This regulatory system ensures on the one hand 
side legal certainty and on the other, the necessary 
flexibility in view of the ever-changing digital 
environment, which may easily upset the balance 
of interests. As far as it seems appropriate, monetary 
compensation through levies should be introduced 
to compensate certain forms of free uses.
58 The open norm only applies to uses which fulfill 
the criteria of a proportionality test. This could 
be guided by the four-step test set out in Art. 107 
US Copyright Act (fair use).21 In order to further 
substantiate the freedoms to use not explicitly 
mentioned in the legislation and to enhance legal 
certainty, complementary regulatory means could 
be established. It might, for instance, be possible 
to create a regulatory authority which defines 
permitted acts of usage under the open norm and 
lays down binding conditions for their applicability 
(e.g. the duty to pay adequate compensation). It 
could also assess whether existing freedoms to use 
are still necessary.
59 Alternatively or even cumulatively, certified user 
associations could be allowed to take representative 
action. Legitimized associations could apply for a 
generally binding decision in front of specialized 
courts determining whether, and if so, under which 
conditions an act of use falls under the open norm 
and thus constitutes a non-commercial users’ right. 
A combination of regulatory instruments, courts, 
regulatory authorities and legislators would be 
involved in the further development of the balance 
of interests, which is so important for the effective 
regulation of creative goods. The involvement of 
all these powers in the development of the law 
can considerably accelerate the advancement of 
regulation and avoid protracted backlogs of reforms.
E. Rights and duties of 
intermediaries
60 Intermediaries are those which engage in the 
21 According to Art. 107 of the US Copyright Act, four factors 
need to be taken into consideration when assessing 
whether an act of use constitutes fair use: (1) The purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work; (3) The amount 
and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) The effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.
widest sense in the storing, making available and 
searchability of creative goods and services, without 
being commercial or non-commercial users or 
creators.22 These include platform providers, web-
hosting and web-sharing services, search engine 
providers, electronic program guides or similar 
services. Also telecommunication providers are in 
this broad sense “intermediaries”.
61 Current copyright law does not govern the interests 
of Internet Service Providers. Since they are – 
according to jurisdiction and legislation – neither 
right owners nor do they engage in acts of use 
relevant under copyright law23, their rights and 
duties are regulated outside the law of copyright. 
Instead they are regulated under Telecommunication 
Laws and especially under ISP liability rules found 
e.g. in the E-Commerce Directive of the European 
Union (2000/31/EC) or the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.
62 In a new regulatory system for creative goods 
intermediaries are of systemic importance. That 
does not mean that intermediaries should be given 
protective rights of their own. It is a rather a question 
of balancing their interests against the interests of 
the other stakeholders involved.
63 As much as the label “intermediary” covers very 
different services and constellations, it may 
generally be said that intermediaries can exert an 
important influence on the commercial exploitation 
and use of creative goods. This becomes all the more 
obvious in the case of search engines and platforms. 
The activities of intermediaries can have a positive 
impact on creators, exploiters and non-commercial 
users, for instance when they enhance the findability 
and visibility of works and thus make them more 
accessible for a larger target group.
64 The activities of intermediaries, however, can also 
have a negative impact, for instance when free 
unlicensed services (such as user generated content 
platforms) start competing with fee-based offers 
provided by the right owners, or when an important 
intermediary obstructs access to creative goods.
22 For the definition see also fn. 7. An intermediary is thus not 
somebody who uses works or creative products in terms 
of the regulatory system (or: copyright) and is thus not 
subject to licensing obligations. The scope of application 
of the intermediaries’ regulations will therefore have to be 
defined according to the acts of use and not according to 
the identity of the user. Since in the online world content 
and infrastructure services are increasingly converging, it 
is very likely that providers are in some cases both users, 
intermediaries and under certain circumstances exploiters. 
The concrete regulations refer – as is the case under the 
current copyright law system – to the particular activity.
23 E.g.: A hosting provider does not copy protected works. It 
rather provides the technical facilities that are used (by end 
users) to copy.
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65 The current legal system has difficulties in defining 
the role of intermediaries, since the economic 
principles of an intermediary´s role cannot be 
captured in a differentiated way under the current 
mechanism.
66 Under current copyright law, an act is either an act of 
use not relevant to copyright law – and thus neither 
requiring permission nor remuneration – or it is an 
act of use to which copyright applies in its entirety. 
Economically, intermediaries often lie somewhere in 
between. Although the intermediary does not “use” 
the provided goods in the legal sense, he profits 
nonetheless to a considerable extent of their being 
made available by third parties (his users), since his 
services would not be attractive without them.
67 On the other hand the commercial success of 
intermediaries is mostly based on their own 
achievements. They render a – for exploiters and 
authors – free service, which can also be beneficial 
for them. User generated content platforms such 
as video services can, for instance, significantly 
enhance the visibility and potential popularity of the 
uploaded creative content. The result is a marketing 
effect that comes for free for the right owners. In 
short: intermediaries are both beneficiaries and 
apporteurs of benefits in relation to creative goods. 
In a regulatory system for creative goods both roles 
need to be captured adequately.
I. The intermediary in the regulatory 
system for creative goods
68 At a glance, three regulatory areas for intermediaries 
can be considered in a regulatory system for creative 
goods:
• A precise definition of the term “intermediary”;
• Whether authors and/or exploiters should have 
a direct claim to a share of the profit or other 
kinds of remuneration against (certain kinds of) 
intermediaries (primary liability);
• Whether intermediaries should be liable for 
right infringing acts of their users (secondary 
liability).
II. Categories of intermediaries
69 The potential for a conflict of interest between 
intermediaries, creators and exploiters depends most 
importantly on the kind of intermediation. Different 
types of intermediaries can be distinguished. Not all 
of them are relevant for the regulatory system for 
creative goods. Only those conflicts need to be solved 
which may have a negative impact on the interests 
of the other actors of the regulative system. As far 
as offers of intermediaries have a positive impact or 
can be rated neutrally in this regard, no legislative 
intervention is necessary.
70 The fact that an intermediary facilitates in some way 
the use of creative goods does not, on its own, point to 
a conflict of interest. In order to distinguish relevant 
conflicts of interests from irrelevant causal chains, 
criteria are necessary, which allow an abstract 
and general assessment of potential conflicts of 
interest which may ensue vis-à-vis particular types 
of intermediaries and which should carry different 
legal consequences.
71 For an appropriate balance of interest, it seems 
necessary to differentiate between intermediaries 
whose offers tend24 to compete with goods and 
services from exploiters/creators or may even 
substitute them (“competing intermediary 
services”), and those whose offers complement the 
goods and services of rights owners or even make 
them possible in the first place (“complementary 
intermediary services”).
72 Complementary services complement the goods 
and services of exploiters and foster the use and 
reception of works and are thus generally neutral 
or even beneficial for right owners. From the overall 
perspective of an information society they fulfill the 
important function of lowering information costs.
73 Competing services on the other hand can constitute 
a threat to the offers of the rights owners. In contrast 
to complementary services, they profit directly from 
the use of protected material. Although they do not 
use protected material themselves (in that case 
they would be non-commercial users or exploiters), 
they generate added value, e.g. by providing their 
users with services outside the marketing channels 
envisaged by creators and exploiters. That may even 
lead to the substitution of goods and services of the 
right holders. It thus appears generally necessary to 
consider intermediaries with potentially competing 
offers in the balance of interests which the regulatory 
system for creative goods envisages.
74 An important indicator for the division between 
competing and complementary offers is the 
24 „Tend to“, since in special cases every offer may have the 
contrary effect. A video platform, for instance, may be 
beneficial for the rights holder due to the advertising effects 
and the increase in publicity; for others on the other hand 
it might be detrimental due to its competitive impact. As 
always in the case of general assessments it is only possible 
to define general cases and to focus the regulations on 
them. For special cases exceptions to the general rule could 
be considered.
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“proximity to the content”. “Close to the content” 
are those services, which allow their users to place 
protected material online and to store and distribute 
it directly. By contrast services which only provide 
the means, especially the technical infrastructure, 
that enable the general use of the Internet are “far 
from the content”. The same applies for services 
which merely systemize materials already available 
on the Internet and make them findable.
75 For instance, Internet access providers may be 
regarded as intermediaries in the sense of the 
definition, since their activities are a sine qua non 
for every Internet communication including the use 
of protected works. However, they only provide the 
technical means that make online communication 
generally possible. They are thus “far from the 
content”. In addition, the offering of Internet access 
does not have a negative impact on the interests of 
creators or intermediaries. The offers of the right 
owners are thereby not substituted or impeded; 
instead they need access providers to enable the 
users to access their services. The fact that illegal 
acts of use are also being made possible does not 
change this fundamental assessment.
76 The same applies to other infrastructure and 
service providers or search engines. Neither do 
they compete with the offers of intermediaries nor 
do they replace them. They merely facilitate their 
searchability. They are therefore not competing 
against but complementing offers in the sense of 
the above categorization as long as they do not 
substitute or compete with the contents to which 
they point.
77 Counterexamples for services which are “close to 
the content” are, for instance, file hosters and video 
and image platforms. Such services can be operated 
in a way that competes with the offers of creators 
and exploiters or even replace them. Whether that 
happens depends on several other factors which 
cannot be examined in detail at this point, e.g. 
whether whole works or – as in the case of images 
– works in their full resolution are published on the 
Internet, whether access extends to everyone or 
only to a distinctive, limited user group, whether 
only own or also other people´s contents can be 
published, etc.
III. Legitimate and illegitimate 
intermediation and the 
consequences
78 Based on the proposed free differentiation the 
regulatory system for creative goods will be able 
to define appropriate legal consequences. Whereas 
intermediaries of complementary offers principally 
do not appear to require regulation, intermediaries 
of competing offers should invoke differently graded 
legal consequences.
79 Certain forms of competing offers may simply not 
be acceptable, for instance, when the service of 
intermediation is marginal and the true intention 
is to freeride and market the works circumventing 
exclusive rights. In this case the services should be 
subject to the full range of legal remedies, including 
injunctions and damages.
80 However, for most intermediaries the competing 
effect results from the attractiveness of the service, 
which represents an added value for the user. Such 
services are legitimate. There is – besides the own 
interest of the provider – a public interest in these 
services, so that they fall under the protection of the 
market and of the law. However, a balance of interest 
between intermediaries, the general public and the 
right owners, whose distribution channels may be 
prejudiced by such offers, needs to be struck.
81 A possible result of such a balancing act could be that 
providers of legitimate (potentially) competing offers 
– contrary to those offers providing complementary 
services – would be given an obligation to pay 
monetary compensation in lieu of their users, e.g. 
in the form of shares in revenue or an adequate 
compensation.
82 This could be justified, since they compete with the 
offers of the right owners or may even replace them, 
without having to invest in content or licensing. 
Their business model is based on the use of protected 
creative content by their users. Experience tells that 
especially non-commercial users do not only upload 
their own contents but also third party content – 
usually without having a license.
83 Unlicensed uses of non-commercial users provided 
through intermediaries are currently usually 
not economically compensated. This appears 
unacceptable in a regulatory system for creative 
goods. Experience has shown that copyright 
enforcement towards non-commercial users is not 
practical and leads to unwanted effects. Monetary 
compensation paid by intermediaries has the 
advantage that remunerations can be raised from a 
central actor and be passed on to the right holders. 
Decentralized licensing or royalty obligations 
towards end-users could also be prevented, avoiding 
mass enforcement against citizens.25 Since the 
25 The contemplated compensation paid in lieu by the 
intermediary does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that all acts of end-users have to be legalized. Both questions 
can in principle be assessed separately. Should it, however, 
emerge that compensatory payments are generally passed 
on to the users, but they are still being sued, legalization 
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intermediaries would only be called upon in lieu of 
the end-users, it would be in their discretion to ask 
users to reimburse them or to find other ways of 
refinancing26 the payments made.
84 Such a solution resembles the systems of levies on 
blank media and storage devices, in which producers, 
traders and importers are liable for the payments in 
lieu of the end-users. In most European countries the 
system proved to be effective, at least in principle. In 
addition, the approach resembles industry specific 
solutions already established in some areas (such as 
YouTube’s Content ID System)27.
IV. Responsibility for legitimate 
intermediary offers with 
competitive potential 
85 The inclusion of intermediaries into the 
remunerative relationship between right holders 
and non-commercial users is potentially contrary 
to their interests. Since their success is based on 
own achievements and self-created added value, and 
they do not engage in any act of use themselves, but 
only profit from the fact that their users do so, they 
should be granted advantages in return. This could 
be, for instance, the limitation of liability for use acts 
of their non-commercial users.
86 It might thus not be far-fetched to reduce the liability 
of intermediaries to purely reactive duties to act in 
a framework of notice and takedown procedures. 
This approach would most probably reduce the 
challenges currently faced by intermediaries in 
many parts of the world, where they sometimes 
face proactive duties to check uploaded content for 
its legitimacy and may even have to pay damages.
87 On the whole, such a system of monetary 
would be inevitable. Otherwise the end-users would be 
charged twice for their uses and could still face legal 
consequences.
26 It would lie in the discretion of the intermediary to decide 
whether and, if so, in which form to make use of this 
opportunity. This would most likely depend on the business 
model and the technical feasibility.
27 The success of YouTube’s Content ID System (see < https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube#Content_ID>), which is 
voluntary for both sides, shows on the one hand that it 
can be more advantageous for intermediaries to make 
payments and share revenues than being exposed to 
legal remedies. In addition, they protect their users and 
maintain their business model. On the other hand, the 
active participation in the program (again voluntarily) by 
music labels and producers shows that such systems are 
regarded as advantageous also by the right owners. It would 
be interesting to examine, whether general lessons could be 
learned from this example. Should this be the case, it might 
be worth considering turning it into a regulatory approach.
compensation and limitation of liability would 
be beneficial for all parties involved: instead of 
restricting the uses on platforms and hosting 
services, revenues would be generated for creators 
and exploiters. The intermediaries would be included 
in the remuneration system but not exposed to 
extended liability. Furthermore the approach would 
create more legal certainty, which is advantageous 
for all actors concerned.
